MathiasTCK (@[email protected])
mastodon.social
@grimalkina I am reminded of the #IteratedPrisonersDilemma "For cooperation to emerge between rational players, the number of rounds must be unknown or infinite. In that case, "always defect" may no longer be a dominant strategy. As shown by Robert Aumann in a 1959 paper, rational players repeatedly interacting for indefinitely long games can sustain cooperation. Specifically, a player may be less willing to cooperate if their counterpart did not cooperate many times," https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner%27s_dilemma

I was reminded of the #IteratedPrisonersDilemma

“For cooperation to emerge between rational players, the number of rounds must be unknown or infinite. In that case, “always defect” may no longer be a dominant strategy. As shown by Robert Aumann in a 1959 paper”